The key to information foundation, reputation mechanism and law enforcement optimization. Based on heavy law enforcement burdens and scarce public law enforcement resources, food safety urgently requires innovative forms of governance. The deterrence created by the reputation mechanism fully considers the long-term income flow of the enterprise. It is a kind of efficient social law enforcement to share the law enforcement load of the regulatory agencies with the help of countless consumers. However, the essence of reputational punishment is the efficient flow of information, and the information gap between the modern food industry and the public makes it difficult for consumers to spontaneously form a strong reputation mechanism. The food safety credit file should be the center, and a legal system for integrating information production, classification, disclosure, and communication should be established to ensure that the illegal information of enterprises quickly enters the public's cognitive structure, laying the foundation for consumers to promptly launch reputational punishment. At the same time, we should take the opportunity of the reputation mechanism as an opportunity to actively explore the social governance of food safety, respond to the cost logic contained in the historical development of law enforcement, and achieve law enforcement optimization. The National Food Safety Law (hereinafter referred to as the “Food Safety Lawâ€) has been in full swing for more than a year. Another famous Chinese company has attracted national attention after the Sanlu Group has triggered a national food safety trust crisis. At one time, the voice of doubts has raised a lot of challenges for the current food safety governance. From the perspective of prevention theory, the essence of all kinds of doubts can be attributed to the following basic questioning: How can potential food safety violations be effectively deterred in order to effectively deter illegal incentives beforehand to deter the theory, this article will Questioning gives a theoretical response with institutional practical significance: based on the double constraint of heavy law enforcement load and insufficient public law enforcement resources, 1 system design should be based on different market masters* This study was awarded the “New Century Excellent Talent Support Program†by the Ministry of Education in 2011. Thank you for your support. 1 Public law enforcement means the law enforcement activities of professional functional departments supported by state public power, which are targeted deterrent tools for private law enforcement and social marginal cost selection. With the help of countless consumers' "vote voting" reputation mechanism, it can promptly launch strict market expulsion punishment, profoundly affect the core interests of enterprises, and effectively deter enterprises from abandoning potential illegal acts. It is an efficient society that assists public law enforcement. Form of governance. Based on its relative technological advantages, the regulatory body should play an active role in the information system of the reputation mechanism, and establish an institutional system covering information production, grading, disclosure, and communication, so as to compensate consumers' cognitive deficiencies and ensure a smooth reputation mechanism. Running. The application of the reputation mechanism in food safety governance is the cost logic of the historical development of law enforcement. It helps to raise the deterrent effect to a reasonable level, and promotes law enforcement optimization with seemingly dispersed and practically powerful social elements. The predicament of inadequate food safety regulation provides a new possibility. It should be noted that, first of all, compared with individuals, enterprises have become the main producers and suppliers in the modern food industry and social food consumption system, and are constitutive variables affecting public health and safety. Their depth and breadth are far from individual. Comparable (especially large and medium-sized enterprises and well-known enterprises with distribution channels and distribution channels all over the country); Secondly, the current processing and production processes of food production and operation enterprises, or marketing promotion strategies, are more related to the internal professions. Type information, the organization of business operations makes its information imbalance with ordinary consumers more prominent; again, based on the law of consumer psychology, enterprises are more likely to be trusted by the public than individuals, and consumers have higher probability of encountering Food safety risks from enterprises. In recent years, quite a number of enterprises, especially well-known enterprises, have repeatedly experienced major food safety incidents. 1 This is evidenced by the national food safety panic. In order to highlight the core factors and new trends in food safety governance, this article will focus on the enterprise, and individuals belonging to the category of “food producers and operators†under the Food Safety Law and other similar market entities are not included in this article. Analysis framework. I. Dual Constraints on Food Safety Supervision With the rapid development of chemical synthesis technology and microbial technology, the modern food industry has mutated to a concept with a high degree of law enforcement. Deterrence theory uses this classification method. 1 See Fang Fei: The Legal Perspective of the KFC "Sudan Red" Incident, March 21, 2005, http://; Wang Xiaohai : "In Guangxi, the Staphylococcus aureus Longfeng dumplings are on the black list", April 14, 2007, http://news.163.com/07/0414/10/3ClKQRV2000120GU.html; Infant formula melamine special inspection information base, reputation mechanism and law enforcement optimization uncertainty risk industry. The use of various preservatives, additives, and stabilizers far exceeds the cognitive ability of ordinary consumers, resulting in a significant decline in their self-protection ability. At the same time, due to the information gap between products and consumers in the industrial society, the company's advertising and social network status has become a consumer guide. However, advertising, social network status, etc. are not necessarily reliable guarantees for product quality. The false propaganda effect contained in it is easy to generate another social risk. It is superimposed on technical risks, which increases the uncertainty in food production, circulation and consumption. Sexuality makes the food safety supervision task very difficult. On the back of the increasingly heavy law enforcement load, it is a fairly scarce public law enforcement resource – extremely limited law enforcement personnel, high testing costs, and insufficient equipment, which makes it difficult to obtain adequate support for safety supervision. Law enforcement performance. Together with the law enforcement load, it constitutes a dual constraint on food safety supervision. The growing characteristics of trust products have led to a growing information gap between the food industry and consumers, which are increasingly at high risk of uncertainty. First, due to the highly intense work pace of modern society, people's dependence on food products that are convenient and saves housework time is only increasing. Food companies have a fundamental impact on consumers' health and safety and become a major source of risk. One of them, the consumer's own ability to resist risks is significantly reduced. Second, with the changes in the dietary structure of modern society, consumers are bound to contact more food types, health foods, nutritious foods, functional foods, etc., and the variety of transactions has increased in a step by step. See also Dennis W. Karl. D. Jeffrey M. Pelov: Modern Industrial Organization, Hu Hanhui, Gu Chengyan, Shen Hua, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2009, pp. 455-456, 474. 2 Richard A. Posner: "Beyond the Law", Su Li translation, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2001, the first security risks. Third, some non-safe foods have a certain incubation period, which has a rather complicated mechanism process with the human body. The consumers cannot know the body feedback in time, and can only recognize the food safety based on the surface symptoms. Fourth, in many cases, food safety is very lacking in observable and identifiable external characteristics for consumers. Even if similar food safety accidents occur, it is difficult to provide sufficient self-protection for other consumers in the future. Guidelines. 12. Research on social risk informatics based on propaganda effects shows that, based on the cost of search, the frequency and expenditure of commercial advertisements are often the usual indicators for people to speculate on the strength of manufacturers and product quality - "untrustworthy enterprises are less It may be advertised in expensive publications or national television stations. 2 Therefore, companies always choose huge advertising investments, high-frequency advertising, and media with a wide range of radiation capabilities to shape brands and display signals. It is easy to use advertising as an indirect signal to reveal the strength of the company and the quality of its products. This is particularly true for food consumers because of the characteristics of trust. Unless public law enforcement entities publish relevant information, or if there is a major food safety incident, it is difficult for consumers to get a clear understanding of the quality of the food, so they will resort to some seemingly convenient alternative criteria. Under the condition of insufficient information, the more food companies with advertising influence, the more likely they are trusted by consumers. In fact, when the financial strength of a company is not necessarily related to food safety, the indirect signal function of advertising will be alienated into a false propaganda effect. The social network status of food companies is also an important factor leading to consumer cognition errors. “In the market competition, the social network status of the company reflects the hierarchical system recognized by people in the same field and has important signal functions.†3 The social network status of a certain enterprise in the same industry is also the lack of more reliable people. The "representative mark" of the product quality is judged at the time of comparing dimensions. According to the general cognitive logic, a company is in the leading/leading position in the same industry, which usually means that it has outstanding advantages over competitors in terms of production, management and quality. This kind of social order has enabled the company to obtain rich "symbolic capital" - some even become "symbolic production institutions" (such as industry quality standards, participation criteria for evaluation criteria), it is easy to visually, auditory and other sensory dimensions. Influencing the public's judgment; in line with it, consumers naturally can easily use the social status label of the leading/leading enterprise as an important parameter guide for consumption decision-making, and establish a rough causal relationship between status label and quality safety. However, this causal chain is very fragile - the Sanlu Group, which triggered the "melamine trend" in 2008, was one of the three major dairy groups in China. In 2011, the main character of the "Clenbuterol Incident" Shuanghui Group was China's largest meat processing. "trust". Relying on its social network status, the “symbolic meaning system†established by leading/leading companies makes food safety more difficult. A typical example is the report on consumer poisoning caused by clenbuterol since the late 1990s. It is common to see newspapers, but it is difficult for ordinary consumers to judge whether or not clenbuterol really disappears from people's lives. (See "Food Safety in Action: China Policy Forum (below)", China Central Television "Economic Half-hour" 2011 2 Dennis W. Carlton, Jeffrey M. Pelov: "Modern Industrial Organization", 456 page. 3 weeks Xue Guang: Ten Lectures on Organizational Sociology, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2003, p. 261. Information base, reputation mechanism and law enforcement optimization identification, even if it hides major security risks, it is difficult for consumers to achieve effective screening in advance. The combination of social risk based on propaganda effect and technical risk based on trust characteristics seriously weakens consumers' self-protection ability and greatly increases the law enforcement load of safety supervision. (2) The scarcity of public law enforcement resources, restricting the performance of food safety supervision. In addition to the increasing burden of law enforcement tasks, another hard constraint of safety supervision is that public law enforcement resources are scarce. From staff to equipment, from testing costs to available funds, investigation reports on food safety supervision in various places generally reflect the serious constraints on law enforcement resources for regulatory performance. Grassroots safety supervision is “less personnel, poor equipment, low level, law enforcement case and supervision basisâ€. Insufficient investment in capacity building has become a basic generalization of current food safety regulation. Take Yueqing City, Wenzhou City, Zhejiang Province as an example. The city has a local population of 1.2 million and a floating population of over 500,000. The number of food safety law enforcement supervisors is only about 10,000, and the regulatory funds are less than one thousandth of GDP. 2 The eastern coastal developed cities are still the same, and the status quo in the vast central and western regions can be imagined. The public law enforcement resources that have been insufficient, and the heavy law enforcement load are superimposed, it is even more scarce: only for the industrial and commercial administrative system responsible for circulation, “the industrial and commercial administrative organs at all levels and the grassroots industrial and commercial organizations bear 103 laws. 201 regulations, 124 administrative regulations, a total of 428 laws, regulations and rules of supervision and enforcement tasks. 3 Under this rigid constraint, a two-division model of law enforcement and specific law enforcement in China is formed. The so-called general law enforcement refers to the general law enforcement of the investigated probability of affecting a series of illegal acts through the regular allocation of resources, such as daily supervision and inspection; specific law enforcement is the specialization of thorough investigation and punishment of specific illegal acts. Law enforcement activities, such as special investigations after major cases. This dualistic boundary usually occurs in the situation of insufficient law enforcement resources, and resource allocation is tilted toward specific law enforcement to ensure law enforcement forces in special periods and major events. In China's food safety governance, the common pattern is: the annual supervision of the food market by important festivals such as the Spring Festival and the Mid-Autumn Festival, or a comprehensive investigation after a major accident. Law enforcement resources are always certain. It can only be configured with limited use between different uses. The various uses are competitive with each other. The resources used for A cannot be used at the same time. The use of resources for a specific purpose is not negligible. opportunity cost. Therefore, if the budget for a fixed period of time is difficult to break through, and more resources are invested in specific law enforcement, it will inevitably weaken the general law enforcement against daily supervision, leading to excessive deterrence in specific periods and more deterrence. 1 "Relying on scientific and technological means to ensure food safety", July 11, 2011, http2, see "Communication and Continuous Improvement of Food Safety Supervision Level - Speech by Hu Guangding and Gao Wenshu on behalf of the General Manager of Minjian Yueqing City", February 23, 2010 day. 3 "Food Safety in Action: China Policy Forum (below)", China Central Television "Economic Half-hour" 2011 5 Deterrence excessive and deterrence, revealing the inefficient and unstable state of food safety supervision. The deterrent power of legal supervision depends on the probability of being investigated and the severity of punishment. For potential offenders, the variable regulation is a kind of intermittent, discontinuous “opportunistic punishment†and “opportunistic punishmentâ€. This means that the probability of investigation is reduced. Under the same severe punishment, due to the reduced probability of investigation, the "opportunistic punishment" will be weakened compared with the sustained "regular punishment" deterrence. Therefore, in addition to a very few "top winds", potential offenders can choose the opportunity to evade supervision through the choice of timing - "avoiding the limelight" in the specific law enforcement process. Type violation Second, strengthen deterrence: the reputation mechanism is caused by technical risks, social risks, the high uncertainty of modern food production, circulation and consumption, making the law enforcement load of the regulatory body very heavy. In addition to the relatively insufficient public law enforcement resources, the combination of dual constraints determines that the system design of food safety governance must have sufficient cost-revenue awareness, must punish efficiency, and strive to maximize potential violations under existing constraints. The deterrent goal is to promote law enforcement optimization. According to the analysis path of preventive theory, deterrence depends on the probability of investigation and the severity of punishment. There is a reverse correlation between the two variables: if the probability of investigation is not high, there must be strict punishment to match it, so that deterrence can be maintained; only when the probability of investigation is significantly improved, the punishment can be mitigated. Severity. In summary, a low probability corresponds to a severe penalty and a high probability corresponds to a light penalty. 1 clarifying this point is particularly prominent in the present. Food safety supervision is a multi-link, all-encompassing law enforcement activity. The heavy regulatory burden and insufficient law enforcement resources affect the probability of investigation. The increase of probability depends on a series of complex social, economic and technological factors. It has a strong ability to quickly mobilize manpower, material resources and financial resources, and requires more qualitative progress in supporting technology. If these factors are difficult to achieve substantial changes in the short-term under the constraints of the existing material technology level, then the system can be used to enhance the severity of another variable, and the deterrent effect of supervision can be raised to a reasonable level. At the level of the situation, the potential opportunity-type violations are blocked, so as to offset the disadvantages of relatively low probability of investigation. The crux of the matter is what is really effective and severe punishment. Different subjects have different utility functions. For the main cost/return of the same value, see Richard A. Posner: Economic Analysis of Law 》, translated by Jiang Zhaokang, Beijing: China Encyclopedia Publishing House, 1997, pp. 292-301. Posner is evading the punishment of the law for the best combination of the probability of investigation and the severity of punishment. Therefore, the more he is motivated to implement this crime; the more he is motivated, the more severe the punishment must be. Achieving deterrence against this crime. (Richard A. Posner: On Plagiarism, Shen Mingyi, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010, p. 94) From this it can be inferred that It is easy to be discovered, the more difficult it is for the implementer to escape the legal sanctions, the less the motive for breaking the law/crime, and the lighter punishment can achieve the deterrent goal. The information foundation, reputation mechanism and law enforcement optimization concept are also different. Just as precious jewels are worthy of the city in the eyes of the rich, in the eyes of extremely hungry people, the value is far less than a bread, and different subjects have very different "loss of loss" caused by the same punishment. 1 The high fines in a certain level are mostly severe punishments for individuals, but for enterprises, especially for large enterprises and well-known enterprises, the same amount of fines is actually low in marginal cost, and the deterrence is very high. low. Here is the question of choosing the right deterrent tool for the marginal cost of different subjects. The difference between enterprises and ordinary individuals and traders lies in the organization. This feature enables enterprises to obtain long-term institutional life. Due to the extension of organizational life, companies will have a large number of opportunities to meet again with all kinds of game opponents - including but not limited to customers, suppliers, regulatory authorities, etc. - to form a long-term game that will help to oppose opportunism. . In a one-time game or a short-term game, even if an subject adopts an opportunistic strategy, the game's opposite party cannot use the power dimension to punish it because it lacks a continuous opportunity to meet with it in the future, and cannot effectively deter it. . At this time, the short-term psychology of “getting away†will become an important incentive for the perpetrator, and induce non-cooperative behavior represented by deception and fraud. On the other hand, if you are faced with a long-term game relationship, the counterpart of the transaction has the realistic possibility of punishing the lieutenant. The past behavior of a subject and the accompanying reputation will become important parameters of the relative decision, breaking the communication and turning to other The market subject will become a credible deterrent, and reputation will become an effective restraint mechanism for opportunistic strategies. At this time, “running a monk can't run the temple†will become the main decision-making parameter of the market. It can be said that due to its organizational nature, the company is in a long-term game, which makes future trading opportunities closely related to its past behaviors. The counterparty will decide whether to continue cooperation according to the reputation of the company's past behaviors, that is, reputation impact. Future trading opportunities. 2 In other words, if the flow of information is smooth, the organizational characteristics of the enterprise can make it more value-oriented than the average individual or trader, give higher value to its future, and comprehensively consider the long-term benefits brought about by the cooperation. . It is precisely because of concerns about the loss of future trading opportunities and future greater returns that enterprises (especially large enterprises and well-known enterprises) are likely to avoid the possibility of fraudulent individuals or traders sitting between them and taking advantage of opportunistic strategies. Lee's "hammer trading", 3 is more likely to become a carrier of reputation, thus becoming an important mechanism for transforming the "secondary game" common to stranger trading into a "repetitive game" for sustainable income. 4 Can imagine, can To achieve appropriate “strict punishment†for enterprises, the following multiple levels of action should be systematically considered: (1) direct expenditure in the form of fines; (2) current trading opportunities lost due to punishment; (3) seeing Zhang Weiying for consumers 3 : Information, Trust and Law, Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore, 2003, p. 43. It should be noted that if information is not smooth, corporate conduct is not perceived by the public, then the opportunistic behavioral strategy remains intact. Long-term revenue streams, at which point companies do not have to worry about losing future trading opportunities. This is the importance of the information base to be analyzed below. The long-term boycott of purchases leads to a reduction or even complete loss of future trading opportunities; (4) the brand value is derogated or even completely lost. The essence of the enterprise lies in obtaining a steady stream of income in the future for a long period of time. If the information on the production and sale of toxic and harmful foods flows quickly and efficiently among consumers and forms a strong reputation mechanism, the punishment from reputation will greatly affect The countless future trading opportunities of the company determine the survival of the company and its brand. Why does the reputation mechanism play a decisive role in the structure of the company's interests? In the modern industrial and commercial society with division of labor and transactions as the core, the main form of transaction is that the non-personalized “stranger trading†parties are highly asymmetric of information. As a social record of past behavior, reputation provides traders with important decision-making information and becomes the main source of information, thus determining whether the transaction is successful or not. Compared with commercial advertising and the social network status of enterprises in the industry, reputation is actually a public opinion with stronger signal function. If there is an accurate reputation mechanism for information, consumers are more inclined to use it as a solution to information incompleteness. And asymmetrical tools. As a result, there are countless potential trading opportunities that can be repeated, and severe market expulsion punishments are initiated, and the long-term income stream of the company's wings is also lost. In this sense, the reputation mechanism is “the weapon of the weakâ€, and 1 is a “severe penalty†with a very high marginal cost. In practice, although it is only beginning to take shape, there are also cases of reputational punishment. The park was exposed to the use of Chenchong to make moon cakes. As a result, the manufacturers of “Guanshengyuan†all over the country suffered greatly, and the sales volume dropped sharply. 2 After the Yasli middle-aged milk powder was declared as the top ten problem milk powder by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, not only immediately In the shopping malls around the world, other products such as Yashili infant milk powder have also been "suddenly tired" and less people care about it. The formation of a similar "connected" brand of strains (such "strains" has also produced some excessive effects, see later Analysis) 3 The most serious is the Sanlu Group, which used to be the “giant†of the dairy industry. After the melamine trend, the Sanlu brand became a negative asset and became a disgusting negative symbol – just as Hitler’s fall, very few Some people named Adolf. 4 In addition to the boycott in the commodity market, the "problem company" of food safety will also be hit hard in the capital market: "Less meat After the reunification of Shuanghui shares, it was closed at the beginning of the stock market. 5 The capital chain is an important lifeline of modern enterprises. Once suddenly broken, the prospects of enterprises are worrying. Although the current China food safety regulatory task is still very difficult, it is undeniable that it is triggering the consumption year on February 23. After the information base, reputation mechanism and law enforcement optimizers implemented the market expulsion, the safety level of the above-mentioned food industry has improved slightly compared with the past, and the reputation penalty that is still in its infancy has exerted a certain deterrent. “The widespread dissemination of information can generally reduce the society’s evaluation of offenders, thus making the offender vulnerable to dealing with others, thereby enabling the offender to take the initiative to make legitimate behavior choices, thereby alleviating the pressure on law enforcement in public institutions. The value of this kind of publicity is especially important in a market-based society where labor division and trade are developed. Its promotion of law enforcement is in many cases a comparison of simple fine tools. 1 It is precisely because of the deterrence of reputation mechanism creation. Taking full account of the multi-stage income of the enterprise and deeply influencing the core part of the enterprise's interest structure, the latter can effectively deter and abandon potential illegal activities, thus sharing part of the law enforcement load of the regulatory body and improving law enforcement performance. . The basis of reputation punishment lies in information. Even if it is in the short-term, it will not be able to significantly improve the probability of investigation. As long as the illegal information of existing enterprises can enter the cognitive structure of consumers in time, a collective consensus is quickly formed. A developed market trading system. It is also enough to rely on “boycott purchases†to warn other companies to abandon potential limps, which has a considerable deterrent effect. However, due to the information gap between modern food production and circulation, it is difficult for consumers to spontaneously form a strong reputation mechanism. It should rely on the relative technical advantages of the regulatory agencies in the production, dissemination and processing of food safety information, 2 to provide an information base for consumers to “vote with their feetâ€, in order to establish an institutionalized and sufficiently stable reputation deterrence. Reference to the source of information on reputation is generally easy to relate to the food safety credit file that China will implement. In fact, if the focus of food safety credit files is only on information recording and distribution, then under the conditions of various information flows in the “communication eraâ€, this system concept still cannot guarantee that the reputation mechanism will play its proper deterrent function. . The reputational mechanism plays a deterrent function and requires strict social conditions. In summary, there are three: First, information elements. 3 The information on the production and sale of toxic and harmful foods must be able to enter the information structure of consumers in time and become the public information of consumption choices. Second, the power requirements. The "power" here is a social functional concept, and it is not necessarily related to the public power subject. Its implication is to reverse the ability of the opponent's cost-benefit relationship. If many consumers are aware of the wrongful behavior of the enterprise and can make the enterprise lose more than its own consumption choices, then it can be said that the power requirements are met. Third, time requirements. What is going on between the business and the consumer is a long-term game, and its illegal behavior can be punished by the opportunity of countless encounters between the two sides. From the time point of view, the enterprise itself is an organizational arrangement that transforms the “one-time game†into the “repetitive gameâ€, and despite the current lack of law enforcement resources, the probability of investigation of food safety violations has not yet reached an ideal level. Regulatory authorities fail to meet sufficient and complete standards in information supply, but they still have considerable comparative technical advantages compared with ordinary consumers. If the illegal information obtained under the current investigation probability level can be “deep processed†through a series of links such as grading, disclosure, dissemination and feedback, so that it can truly enter the consumer's cognitive structure and become an effective purchasing decision guide, the regulatory agency still It is a positive information provider, and of course it can play a role in the information infrastructure of the reputation mechanism. 3 The significance and access to information in food safety governance. (See Jian Jiangang: "To tell the truth to power: the prospect of re-engagement between food-payers and the future re-encounting guarantees the possibility of the latter to impose punishment, 1 and thus the slang of "running a monk can't run the temple"; From the perspective of power, most food industries are in a competitive market, and their products have a wide variety of substitutes or similar products. Consumers can adopt the strategy of “exiting purchase†and turning to other competitors to sanction a company’s illegal activities. Market-to-transaction is the lifeline of an enterprise. Once the “exit purchase†strategy is extended from the individual to the group, it is tantamount to subverting the cost-benefit relationship of the enterprise, and may even declare the end of the enterprise. In the era when the commodity is not scarce, the power requirement It is not difficult to satisfy. Therefore, the key to the problem lies in whether the information flows smoothly and evenly. The recording and centralized distribution of information does not necessarily mean that the above information requirements are met. Under the premise that there is a regular release system for food quality information in China, According to a survey conducted by CCTV, there are still up to 86.7% of respondents who believe that the food is solved. The safety issue should “increase the exposure of illegal enterprisesâ€. The proportion of respondents who choose “heavy code reform, strengthen relevant laws and regulations†and “strengthen producer education and self-discipline†is nearly 5 percentage points (82.1%), exceeding The proportion of selecting “reinforcing supervision by relevant departments†is as high as nearly 19 percentage points (67.9%). It can be seen that most consumers believe that they are still in a “uninformed†situation, and public law enforcement entities have not dealt with the existing illegal information. Can successfully connect with the consumer's information structure, fail to become an effective parameter of consumer decision-making, leading to communication failure. The lack of necessary information is not difficult to find, the information base of reputation is far more complicated than the release of a single food safety credit record. Much more, it is not only a summary and centralized release of information, but also a systematic category covering information production, grading, disclosure, and communication. It should change the one-way information transmission mode and take a holistic standpoint around the plan. Food safety credit file, whether the relevant information truly becomes part of the consumer information structure, whether it is actually sent The guiding role of the consumption decision-making is to test the standard and establish a credit system from information production to information feedback, which promotes the efficient flow of illegal information in the public and provides a solid foundation for consumers to initiate reputational punishment. III. Information Foundation: The system of food safety credit structure The information infrastructure of reputation needs a holistic perspective. If the credit file is the core, the food safety credit system under the concept can be classified, disclosed, disseminated and feedback integrated. Then it will become an effective information base. In this sense, a systemic system of food safety credits should be developed from the following levels. Providing food safety credit information by regulators should be an efficiency-oriented measure: if information can be perceived by some people at a relatively low supervision cost, it will be a better choice for this group of people to provide information. Technical advantages and information processing capabilities determine that regulators should play an active role in the information of reputation mechanisms. However, the essence of reputation is to have a clear grading system as a support. If we neglect the uniformity of rating standards, such as the “multi-center pattern†of China's food safety standards system, then despite the “Food Safety Law†for safety credit files. The original intent of the legislation is to use the information superiority of the regulatory body to judge the advantages and disadvantages of the food safety obligation of the enterprise. The uncertainty of the judgment will still dissolve the distinguishing function of the food safety credit file, so that it cannot give the credit level of the enterprise. An accurate public evaluation cannot form a stable hierarchical structure in the public's cognition; at the same time, the information superiority of the regulatory body also loses its proper meaning. It can be said that the lack of uniform standards and the well-intentioned credit file system can not only provide reliable safety guidance for consumers' judgments and decision-making, but also make the current food market information more messy, and the expectation of constructing the information base of the reputation mechanism is also expected. So it fell. The credit rating standard is also a fair game process that balances and coordinates the interests of all parties. It must be based on an effective negotiation mechanism to ensure that the respective demands of stakeholders involved in food safety can be met by Zhou Xueguang: Organizational Sociology Ten Lectures, pp. 272-274. Zhou Xueguang: Ten Lectures on Organizational Sociology, p. 252. Fully expressed, different voices can be listened to seriously. Otherwise, the lack of a multi-discrimination credit standard is easily alienated into a department, interest group "1 language hall" lost the proper meaning of protecting consumers. The construction of the negotiation mechanism should focus on the following key dimensions. First, establish a unified communication and coordination organization. A highly authoritative coordinating body is a powerful lever to eliminate disagreements and reach consensus. This is an effective institutional arrangement for many countries in food safety governance. Typical example is the central department established by the UK in 1978 as a local authority trade standard coordination agency. The main purpose is to provide a forum for the country’s enterprises to resolve differences and differences, and for enterprises in other countries. The problems encountered provide the main points of consideration. 1 In China's institutional practice, taking into account the authority and decision-making level, the Food Safety Office of the State Council can serve as the central coordination function, laying the organizational foundation for effective communication. Second, identify stakeholder participation as a full-scale right. The unified credit rating standard involves multiple stages, including information research, draft announcement, opinion collection, and question feedback, which form a chain of sequential programs. If stakeholders can only selectively participate in one or several links rather than all, their information is still insufficient, and the right to know and express are still incomplete, and they cannot affect the allocation of rights and obligations that are closely related to them. 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Information Foundation, Reputation Mechanism and Law Enforcement Optimization: A New Vision of Food Safety Governance